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Introduction
The Republic of Korea, also known as South Korea, has since the year 2000 been the 
global leader in broadband use. Korean broadband connections have on average 4 
megabits per second, and 50 megabits per second connections are widely available. 
Most European broadband connections would not be counted as broadband 
connections in Korea, as the official definition for high-speed Internet connection 
requires more than 1 Mbps connections. Korea has now more WiFi hot spots than the 
U.S. Three licenses for the new mobile Internet, WiBro, were granted in January 
2005. Reflecting heavy competition and financial difficulties in the broadband service 
sector, one of the licensees, Hanaro Telecom, gave up its WiBro license in April 
2005, just before it was to pay its first license fee.
Korea had about 12 million broadband subscribers in March 2005. It had about 10 
percent of the global xDSL subscriptions, the second largest subscriber count after 
China. In December 2004, Korea had 31.58 million people who had used the Internet 
during the previous month, or 70 percent of the over-6 year population. Yet, on the 
World Economic Forum’s Network Readiness Index, it ranked only 24th, just after 
United Arab Emirates and before Estonia.
The Republic of Korea is the leading country in broadband penetration. Its position as 
the first mover in several broadband developments makes it an interesting case, also 
for highlighting challenges that may become important for other countries. Important 
social, economic, technical, and policy factors are clearly visible in this country. This 
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chapter, therefore, provides a relatively detailed description of the history of the 
Korean developments and its context. The chapter uses recent statistical data and 
combines results from several earlier studies to analyse the reasons for the rapid 
broadband diffusion in Korea and to highlight potential lessons in the development of 
broadband policies in the EU.
Korea is geographically somewhat larger than Portugal or Hungary. It has a higher 
population density than all European countries except Malta, about the same as the 
Netherlands, twice as high as the U.K., and 25 times higher than Sweden. About 80 
percent of its population lives in urban areas, about 70 percent in its seven largest 
cities, and almost 50 percent in large high-rise apartment complexes.
Figure 1. The Republic of Korea (source: CIA Factbook).
The legal system in South Korea combines elements of continental European civil law 
systems, Anglo-American law, and Chinese classical thought. It ranks 47th in the 2004 
Corruption Perceptions Index produced by Transparency International, worse than 
Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, but before Greece and Czech Republic. Its overall rating 
was 4.5—higher than Poland (3.5) and Latvia and Slovakia (4.0), but considerably 
lower than the leading countries Sweden (9.2), Denmark (9.5) and Finland (9.7). The 
Korean economic system has historically been characterised by large and extremely 
diversified family conglomerates called chaebols. The “big five” chaebols are the 
Hyundai, Samsung, LG, Daewoo, and SK groups.
The basic demographic indicators of the Republic of Korea are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Basic demographic indicators of the Republic of Korea.
Total area  98,480 sq km
Land area  98,190 sq km
Population  48,598,175 (July 2004 est.)
Population density  495 persons per sq km
0-14 years  20.4% (male 5,223,344; female 4,681,594) 
15-64 years  71.4% (male 17,625,302; female 17,072,029) 
65 years and over  8.2% (male 1,597,085; female 2,398,821) (2004 est.)
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Median age  33.7 years
Population growth rate  0.62% (2004 est.)
Life expectancy at birth  75.57 years
Migration rate  0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2004 est.)
Ethnic groups  homogeneous (except for about 20,000 Chinese)
Human capital Literacy  97.9%
PISA 2003 
rankings
Mathematics
Reading
Science
Problem solving
3rd
2nd
4th
1st
Economic overview
Since the early 1960s, South Korea has achieved an incredible record of growth and 
integration into the high-tech modern world economy. In 2004, it was the 9th biggest 
OECD economy and the 11th largest economy in the world, when measured in 
nominal GDP. Four decades ago its GDP per capita was comparable with levels in the 
poorer countries of Africa and Asia, at less than 100 USD per capita. Today its GDP 
per capita is about 15 times North Korea’s.1 South Korea is now in the same low-
middle income group as Spain, Israel, New Zealand, Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Malta, Czech Republic and Hungary.2 This success was achieved by a 
system of close government/business ties, including directed credit, import 
restrictions, active promotion of specific industries through five-year plans, and 
strong labour effort supported by cultural factors. Historically, the government has 
promoted the import of raw materials and technology at the expense of consumer 
goods and encouraged savings and investment over consumption.
In 2003, GDP per capita in Korea was about $18,000, or 52 percent of U.S. in 
purchasing parity adjusted terms. GDP per employed person was $39,349. In 2004, 
agriculture represented about 3 percent of the GDP, industrial production about 40 
percent and services about 56 percent. In nominal terms, the GDP per capita for year 
2004 was about 13,000 US$, and purchasing power adjusted GDP per capita about 
19,200 US$. Adjusted for purchase power parity, the annual growth of GDP was 7.4 
percent in the 1980-1990 period, and 5.9 percent over the 1980-2003 period.
Korean won exchange rate was in 3 January 2005 about 1,040 KRW per US$ and 
1,400 KRW per euro. In mid-2005, the exchange rate is close to 1,010 won for a 
dollar. For historical data, this report uses exchange rates of 1,300 and 1,200 per US$, 
depending of the year.
1 The estimates typically range from14-18 times the North Korean GDP. The GDP numbers are not 
necessarily very accurate; for North Korea because of lack of data and for South Korea because of the 
importance of ICT products which are not measured well in the current statistics.
2 OECD 2005, Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures: 2002 Results.
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Figure 2. Real GDP per capita in Korea (PPP adjusted)
In general South Korea has been a clear economic success story. The Asian financial 
crisis of 1997-98, however, exposed some weaknesses in its development model. The 
problems included massive foreign borrowing and an undisciplined financial sector. 
Growth plunged to a negative 6.6% in 1998. Korea, however, recovered quickly, 
helped by rapid growth in ICT exports, including semiconductor memory chips, TFT-
LCD displays, and mobile phones. In 1999 the overall economic growth was 10.8%. 
Growth fell back to 3.3% in 2001 because of the slowing global economy and falling 
ICT exports. Led by consumer spending and exports, growth in 2002 was an 
impressive 6.2%, despite slow global growth, followed by moderate 2.8% growth in 
2003. The fast growth of 2002, however, was to some extent created by a rebound 
from the slump of 2001, as well as a rise in semiconductor memory prices. The 
growth in 2004 was under 4.6 percent, more than one percent less than expected 
during the first half of the year. The business and consumer confidence indicators 
were pessimistic in the beginning of 2005. In May 2005, the country recorded 
negative growth of IT outbound shipments for the first time since February 2002. IT 
exports, which have been the main source of economic growth during the last years, 
fell at 2.1 percent annual rate from May 2004. The main reasons for the decline were 
the depreciation of the US dollar and the very rapid decline in flat-panel display 
prices. The value of flat-panel display exports plunged 26.3 percent from the previous 
year. The current estimates show that the Korean ICT exports growth may remain 
close to zero in 2005.
Historically, economic development in South Korea has been driven by coordinated 
industrial policy and centralised five-year plans, which have systematically pushed 
the economy towards high-value added industries. Import substitution, increased 
knowledge-intensity, and cultural values that promote hard work and human capital 
development have been important factors in the development of the ICT sector in 
Korea. Foreign Investment Zones and incentives for research and development have 
also been important, making, for example, Nokia and Philips major investors in 
Korea.
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In 2003 the National Assembly approved legislation reducing the six-day workweek 
to five days. The salary levels in the ICT industry were the third lowest in OECD 
countries, after Hungary and Czech Republic in 2002. Corrected for purchasing 
power, however, the Korean ICT workers earned similar salaries than workers in the 
U.S., Japan, and Ireland. For engineers, the income levels were relatively low when 
compared with global levels. In the large Korea cities the living costs are high, with 
Seoul being as expensive a city to live in as San Francisco. Only a relatively small 
fraction of total labour force, about 6 percent, worked in ICT industries in 2002. The 
discrepancy between the high percentage of ICT of total GDP and low percentage of 
labour force is explained by the fact that Korea focuses on high-value added and 
export-oriented ICT manufacturing, where labour inputs are low.
Korea ranks in the top four in science, mathematics, problem solving, and reading 
skills among 15-year old students, putting it second after Finland among the OECD 
countries.3 The high ranking, however, hides important challenges in the Korean 
education system. According to IMD (2003) and WEF (2003) surveys, Korea’s 
mathematics and science education level is one of the lowest among OECD countries. 
In particular, Korea's education and training level in IT is in the mid to low 
percentiles, placing Korea 21st among OECD members. The social interest in science 
and technology are below the OECD mean, and considerably lower than in Singapore, 
India, China, and Finland, for example. Korea, however, has the largest share of 
engineering degree holders among total university graduates in the world. About 41 
percent of degree holders with BAs, MAs and PhDs majored in science and 
engineering, compared to 29.2 in Japan and 18 percent in the U.S.4 In addition, about 
400,000 Koreans studied abroad in 2004.
The Korean educational culture is based on Confucian values where education is 
perceived as a main source of social advancement, and parents are held socially 
responsible for guaranteeing that their children succeed well at school. This means, in 
practice, that Korean children often study very long hours, frequently complementing 
the basic schooling with various forms of private teaching. Comparing the educational 
achievements in the 15-year group between the two leading countries Korea and 
Finland shows, however, that Finnish students achieve the same or better results with 
considerably less hours of study. It is commonly argued that in the Korean 
educational system, competition within the peer-group becomes a factor that at least 
partially hinders the development of collaboration skills, autonomous competencies 
and innovativeness. As in all educational systems influenced by Confucian values, 
internalisation of pre-existing knowledge is often valued more than the creation of 
revolutionary and creative new ideas and knowledge. This is frequently perceived as a 
challenge, as Korea strives to move to a leading position in the knowledge- and 
innovation-based economy.
3 OECD: Learning for Tomorrow’s World: First Results from PISA 2003. Available at 
http://www.pisa.oecd.org. 
4 Park Chung-a: Korea ranked 34th for quality of life: KITA report shows Seoul World’s No. 1 IT 
Power. The Korea Times, 30 September 2005.
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Korean ICT exports have been growing rapidly during the recent years. In 2003, 
Korean ICT exports were, however, hurt by geopolitical factors, including the Iraq 
war, North Korean nuclear crisis, SARS, levying of tariffs on Hynix by the U.S. and 
EU, and to some extent relocation of LCD production to China. In 2004, the ICT 
exports were a main source of growth in Korea and ICT exports were still expected to 
continue strong, at an average rate of 17.8 percent during the 2003-8 period.5 Due to 
the rapid depreciation of the U.S. dollar, fast price declines, and the fact that Korean 
export prices strongly depend on the U.S. dollar, year 2005 export growth may, 
however, remain close to zero.
The U.S. has been the main customer of Korean ICT products, although China is 
rapidly becoming the largest importer. This can be seen in Table 2, which shows the 
five largest import destinations of Korean ICT products. In 2002, seven percent of 
Korean ICT exports went to mainland China and eight percent to Hong Kong. In 2003 
China and Hong Kong imported together 26.8 percent whereas the U.S. imported 20.4 
percent of Korean exports.
Table 2. Top five export destinations of Korean ICT products (source: KISDI).
Rank 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 U.S. (29%) U.S. (28%) U.S. (29%) U.S. (31%) U.S. (27%) U.S.(20.4%)
2 Japan (10%) Malaysia 
(8%)
Japan (9%) Japan (10%) Japan 
(10%)
China(15.6%)
3 Malaysia 
(8%)
Hong Kong 
(8%)
Taiwan (8%) Hong Kong 
(7%)
Hong Kong 
(8%)
Hong 
Kong(11.2%)
4 Singapore 
(8%)
Japan (7%) Hong Kong 
(7%)
Singapore 
(7%)
China (7%) Japan(8.5%)
5 Hong Kong 
(7%)
Taiwan (7%) Singapore 
(7%)
Taiwan (7%) Taiwan 
(7%)
Taiwan(5.7%)
Total 62% 58% 60% 61% 59% 61%
The communication market 
The diffusion of broadband in Korea is closely related to Information Society policies 
that have actively promoted the ICT industry. Korean policymakers have used the 
domestic market to improve the global competitiveness of the industry, as part of their 
development policies, combining export-led industrial policy with policies for local 
capability development. Korean manufacturers are now the leading producers in 
DRAM and flash memories. Korean LCD displays account for about 45 percent of 
global market. According to recent market estimates, Korean plasma display panel 
(PDP) manufacturers produced about 50 percent of the world output in 2004. Korean 
firms also dominated the organic light-emitting diodes (OLED) display market, with 
Samsung SDI having a 40 percent global market share. Since 1996, Korea has been 
the leading manufacturer of cathode-ray tubes, now with about 57 percent global 
market share.6
5 KISDI 2004: IT Industry Outlook of Korea 2004.
6 Digital Chosun 2004: Korea oversteps Japan’s lead in display panels market. 8 December 2004.
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Korean firms are also leading producers in broadband subscriber equipment and have 
rapidly gained market share in mobile phones. Domestic production of IT equipment 
in 1999 amounted to about US$ 70 billion (86.8 trillion KRW) and in 2003 to about 
US$ 120 billion. The software market has increased annually 31.4 percent over the 
1998 to 2003 period, from KRW 4.684 trillion to 18.319 trillion (15.4 billion US$). 
Software exports grew at an average annual rate of 41.9 percent, from US$ 52 million 
to US$ 304 million in the same period. In 2003 the exports, however, declined 0.1 
percent from the previous year. Packaged software declined 27.4 percent from the 
pervious year to 57.5 million US$. Computer service markets grew at an average 
annual rate of 28.1 percent, and the digital contents production at 46.4 percent annual 
rate in the 1998-2003 period.7
The most rapid growth was in communications equipment, where the compound 
average annual growth rate was 32.3 percent over the 1996 to 2002 period. Korea is 
now in this area about twice as large an exporter than Japan and probably reaching the 
size of than Germany. In electronic components, Korea exported 20.4 billion US$ in 
2002, compared to Germany’s 14.7 billion, U.K.’s 12.0 US$ billion and Japan’s 39.9 
billion.8 Korea had the second largest ICT goods export/import ratio in 2002; at the 
same level as Japan (1.7), after Finland (1.9), and higher than Ireland (1.5). Since 
1996, Korea has also had the fastest growth in its ICT exports, as can be seen in 
Figure 3. As of 2003, mobile handsets accounted for 67.3% of all communications 
equipment exports, and the figure is expected to rise to 79% by 2008. The production 
of communications equipment is expected to rise at an average annual rate of 16.7 
percent and exports by 23.5 percent through 2008.9 These numbers, however, do not 
take into account the impact of the recent depreciation of the US dollar.
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Figure 3. Trade of ICT goods as a share of total trade, 1996-2002 (data from OECD).
7 NCA 2004, Broadband IT Korea Informatization White Paper.
8 OECD 2004, Information Technology Outlook 2004.
9 KISDI 2004: IT Industry Outlook of Korea 2004.
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Since year 2000, Korea has been the country with the highest rate of broadband access 
in the world. According to OECD, Korea’s broadband access rate at the end of year 
2004 was 24.9 per 100 persons, ahead of the runner-up Netherlands’s 19 per 100. In 
December 2004, 70.2 percent, or 31.58 million Koreans aged 6 and older had used 
Internet at least once in the previous month.10 The number is somewhat smaller if the 
OECD definition of broadband penetration is used. Since December 2004, the Korean 
Internet statistics count as Internet users also mobile phone users who access Internet 
only through their phones (about 280,000 persons).
According to the Ministry of Information and Communication, in March 2005 there 
were about 12 million broadband Internet subscribers in total. In December 2004, 
72.2 percent of Korean households had a wired Internet access at home. The most 
popular access mode was xDSL, with 86 percent of households using it, followed by 
cable modems (13.5 percent), dial-up (4.2 percent) and ISDN (1.5 percent).11 Males 
are more frequent users, at 76 percent of over-6 year population. 65 percent of 
females use the Internet, or 46 percent of all Internet users. The female usage rate, 
however, has been growing faster than male usage rate. The highest usage rate was in 
the 6-19 year age group with 96.2 percent, but the fastest growth was in the age group 
of people in their 40’s and 50’s. Almost all students used the Internet (98.1 percent) 
and the next highest usage rates were in the professionals/managers demographic 
group (95.5 percent). The highest annual increase was seen in the sales and services 
workers group, where the usage increased 14.2 percent to 65.8 percent between 
December 2003 and December 2004.
10 Survey on the Computer and Internet Usage. Ministry of Information and Communication, National 
Internet Development Agency of Korea, February 2005.
11 Survey on the Computer and Internet Usage. Ministry of Information and Communication, National 
Internet Development Agency of Korea (NIDA), February 2005. The cable modem use rate reported in 
the survey is, however, considerably lower than the about 30 percent subscriber share of cable reported 
by the operators. See Table 4 below.
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Figure 4. Internet users in Korea (source: KRNIC and NIDA).
Wired Internet Users
31.30 million
Wireless Internet
Users
7.18 million
Figure 5. Internet users in Korea, December 2004.12
Pricing of broadband services
Broadband access prices have been low since their launch in 1998, typically around 
25-30 US$ including modem rental. The low subscriber prices reflect mainly heavy 
competition. Broadband service providers competed by investing in their own 
facilities and generated large losses during the first years, hoping that larger market 
shares and customer bases would later allow them to become profitable. In this sense, 
the new broadband entrants introduced the “forward falling new economy” logic to 
Korea.
12 Survey on the Computer and Internet Usage. Ministry of Information and Communication, National 
Internet Development Agency of Korea, February 2005.
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The historically low subscriber prices of Korea also reflect some government pressure 
to promote rapid diffusion of broadband. Although prices have not been regulated, the 
Ministry of Communications and Information has indicated to the operators that it 
would be good if the prices would be low. When facilities-based competing service 
providers entered the Internet access market, their low flat-fee pricing rapidly 
attracted existing dial-up Internet customers. This has been an important factor in 
making Korea the global leader in broadband penetration.
Given the level of average income, the subscription prices, however, have been higher 
than the EU average. In economic terms, and given the fact that broadband 
penetration has been high, Koreans apparently have been willing to pay more for their 
broadband services than most Europeans. This can be seen in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Broadband subscription cost as percentage of average monthly income, 2003 (data 
from OECD).
The picture, however, changes radically when the connection speed is taken into 
account. The average connection speed in Korea is now 4 megabits per second, and 
the subscription to 20-40 megabit per second service costs about 50 US$ per month. 
In comparison with the EU countries, Koreans have often ten times higher bit rate per 
euro. This can be seen in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Broadband subscription cost per 100 bit per second, as percentage of monthly income, 
2003 (data from OECD).
The drop of the US dollar has increased the prices when measured in dollar terms, to 
above 32 US$ monthly fees including equipment rental. In January 2005, KT 
xDSL/BWLL service was about 25 euros, including terminal rental and taxes, LAN 
access about 23 euros, and satellite about 26 euros per month. For customers that 
were willing to wait 15 days for the installation, the one-time installation fee of about 
21 euro was waived. Satellite service subscribers had to pay for the installation of 
their equipment separately. Thrunet’s broadband cable modem service was about 33 
euros, and a low-speed 1-1.5 Mbps connection was available for 25 euros, including 
equipment rental and taxes. Thrunet also provided ADSL connections to customers it 
could not reach using its cable network, at about 25 euros per month. In addition, 
Thrunet had a reduced cost service for customers who were willing to receive 
advertisements.
The supply side: Major operators and the level of competition for 
each type of service.
The rapid development of telecommunications in the Republic of Korea is a relatively 
new phenomenon. Although the first automatic exchange was introduced in the Korea 
in 1935, up to 1960s telephones were mainly used for military and government 
purposes. The incumbent operator is Korea Telecom (KT), which was established in 
December 1981. KT was created to address the rapidly growing demand for private 
telephones in the 1970s, which had put hundreds of thousands of people on waiting 
lists for telephone connections. The Korean government pushed for a one-phone, one-
family policy, directed investments in rural areas to minimize regional disparities, and 
funded ETRI (Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute) to develop 
Korean telecommunications equipment. Korea Telecom was created as a fully 
government-owned corporation by separating the communication sector from the 
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Ministry of Communications (Now Ministry of Information and Communication). 
The statute of Korea Telecom was changed in 1989 to allow for its privatisation. The 
privatisation process has been a lengthy one, and closely linked with telecom 
deregulation and privatisation efforts in Korea. The Korean government has gradually 
reduced its ownership interest in KT since 1993. Upon the repeal of the Korea 
Telecom Act as of October 1, 1997, KT became a government invested institution 
regulated by the Korean Commercial Code and changed its name from Korea 
Telecom to Korea Telecom Corporation. The government completed the disposition 
of all of its equity interest in KT on May 24, 2002. On March 22, 2002, the company 
changed its name from Korea Telecom Corporation to KT Corporation.
In its initial stage, KT focused on supplying telephone facilities to the general public. 
In 1980, Korea still had the low household telephone penetration or 21 percent. The 
company expanded from about 4.5 million telephone lines in 1982 to about 20 million 
lines in 1993. By 1990, Korea had household telephone penetration of 90 percent. 
This created a strong domestic demand for telecom equipment. Telecommunications 
was given a priority in the fifth Five-Year Socio-Economic Development Program, 
which run from 1982 to 1986. With a coordinated policy between KT and ETRI, 
Korea developed the world's 10th domestic electronic switch TDX-1, in 1984.
Although telecommunication infrastructure improved rapidly during the 1980s, in the 
early 1990s Korea was still catching up the leading countries. It had 38 telephone 
lines per 100 inhabitants in 1993. In the same year Japan and the U.K. had 47, 
Germany 46, and France and the U.S. 53 telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. Mobile 
phone penetration was about one percent, less than a quarter of the U.S. mobile phone 
penetration of 4.4 per hundred inhabitants in that same year.13
Partly because of pressure from the U.S., Korea started to liberalise its telecom sector 
during the 1990s. It first opened international long distance service, with the entry of 
Dacom in December 1991. Dacom was originally set up as a government monopoly 
to construct and operate data communication networks in 1982. When the data 
communication market was opened for value added network services in the early 
1990s, Dacom was allowed to enter the voice market and to start to compete with KT. 
In January 1996, the domestic long distance service became a duopoly when Dacom 
entered the market. The last monopoly market, local telecom services, opened for 
competition in April 1999 with the entry of Hanaro.
Korea joined the International Telecommunication Union in 1952 and signed the 
World Trade Organization agreement on basic telecommunication services that 
became effective in November 1997. The WTO agreement committed the country to 
liberalisation of its telecommunication sector. The dial-up Internet service market was 
opened through trade negotiations with the US already in 1989. In addition, the 
Uruguay Round in 1994 eased regulations for entry and pricing conditions from 
13 Jeong, K-H. & J.L.King (1997): Korea’s National Information Infrastructure: Vision and Issues. In 
B. Kahin & E. Wilson (eds.) National Information Infrastructure Initiatives: Vision and Policy Design. 
The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997, p. 122.
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registration to notification and abolished foreign ownership limitations on domestic 
value-added service providers.14
In 2001, local telephone services were provided by 33 facility-based carriers, value 
added telecommunications services by 4,890 carriers, and special telecommunications 
services by over 78 carriers. To a great extent, foreign investments were liberalized.
Although KT has given some of its market to its competitors, it is still the dominant 
service provider in fixed-line communication networks. The KT market share in year 
2001 in the different market segments can be seen in Table 3.
Table 3. Telecom liberalisation in Korea (source: ITU15).
Service Year competition was 
introduced
KT’s market share, 2001
Local service 1999 96.9 %
Domestic long 
distance 1996 85.5 %
International long 
distance 1991 67.1 %
Under the Korean law, the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) and 
other government entities have extensive authority to regulate KT. The MIC has 
responsibility for approving rates for local service and interconnection services 
provided by KT. Beginning in January 1998, KT was allowed to set its own rates for 
domestic long-distance service, international long-distance service and other services 
without approval from the MIC.
The entry of Hanaro became a critical turning point in the development of broadband 
in Korea. Hanaro was created in June 1997, when MIC licensed a second local 
telephone operator. With government encouragement, Korea’s chaebols, including 
LG Group and SK Group, jointly formed Hanaro and provided it with strong 
economic backing. Hanaro was originally supposed to increase competition in the 
local phone services. Its launch, however, occurred exactly at the time of the Asian 
currency crisis, when the Korean economy contracted rapidly. It also became clear 
that Hanaro would have a very difficult time in competing with KT, as there was no 
number portability and KT was able to charge large reconnection costs from 
customers who switched to Hanaro and who subsequently wanted to switch back to 
KT. Realising its difficult position, Hanaro decided to focus on the provision of 
Internet connection.
After studying alternatives, Hanaro focused on ADSL, for which it originally 
purchased equipment from Alcatel. The idea was to lay out fibre to access large 
14 Lee, Nae-Chan, Broadband Internet Service: Korea’s Experience. KISDI, February 2002.
15 Kelly, T., V. Gray & M. Minges (2003) Broadband Korea: Internet Case Study. ITU, 2003, p.5.
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apartment blocks and then use ADSL within the building to provide broadband 
service for the end customers. The strategy also relied on the expected rapid decline 
of ASDL equipment costs.16 Hanaro also collaborated with the cable network operator 
Powercomm17 to provide cable modem broadband access to those households that it 
could not economically reach using its own network. Powercomm was eager to sell 
access to its hybrid fibre cable network, as it was legally barred from engaging in 
retail services, with its business operations limited to wholesales to fixed-line telecom 
providers and regional cable television operators. To increase the coverage of its 
services, Hanaro also used unbundled local copper network from KT.
Hanaro was able to roll out broadband services extremely rapidly partly because the 
Korean construction regulations require that large apartment buildings have a central 
telecommunications room. In Korea, the wiring within the buildings is owned and 
controlled by the building owners. In this sense, Korea has no “local-loop bottleneck,” 
and regulators have not had to create complex rules for accessing the local loop. After 
getting access to the local decision-maker who controlled the building’s 
telecommunications room, it was a relatively easy task for Hanaro to drop fibre to the 
room and provide services for all the households in the building. Hanaro first focused 
on large apartment complexes, with more than 300 households, and later targeted 
smaller complexes with 200 households.
The incumbent KT was a late bloomer in the high-speed Internet market, which was 
opened by the cable network operator Thrunet in July 1998. KT had a slow start 
partly because it believed that future broadband services would be based on ISDN 
according to earlier national Information Society visions. KT was, for example, 
heavily invested in the government Broadband Integrated Services Digital Network 
(BISDN) project that was originally planned to run from 1992 to 2015. It had also 
launched pilot tests with ADSL in 1997 and decided that, due to the high equipment 
costs, ADSL could not be a viable broadband technology. According to KT’s 
calculations, it needed at least half a million subscribers who would pay 50 to 60 US$ 
per month to break even.18 When KT realised that Hanaro and Thrunet were about to 
carve a slice of the emerging broadband market, it, however, reacted rapidly. It was 
ranked first in the domestic industry already in June 2000, a year after launching its 
commercial services. Its high-speed Internet service subscribers exceeded 4 million in 
March 2002 and 5 million in December 2002, making KT the largest broadband 
access provider in the world.
16 The purchasing price of ADSL modems fell from about 600 US$ in 1999 to less than 100 US$ in 
2002. For cost breakdown, see footnote 28.
17 In 2002, Powercomm, established in January 2000, had 75,170 km of fibre-optic cable lines across 
the nation and other intercity networks. Its clients included LG Telecom, Thrunet, Hanaro, SK Telecom 
and Dacom. It was owned mainly by Korea Electric Power Corporation. After privatisation and 
Hanro’s unsuccessful attempt buy it, Powercomm became part of the LG Group in February 2003. 
Powercomm now has 95,000 km of optical backbone cable and a 57,000 km hybrid fibre-cable (HFC) 
network.
18 DTI Overseas mission to South Korea. Brunel University, 2002, p.16.
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The Korean broadband and telecommunications market has been characterised by 
fierce competition since the end of the 1990s. This has also meant that service 
providers have had difficulties in making profit. For example, in 2001, only KT and 
one of the mobile operators made profit. During its history, Hanaro, the second largest 
broadband provider, has never made net profit. To some extent this was because it 
invested very heavily in new facilities until year 2000, in an attempt to gain market 
share. After that it has rapidly decreased its annual capital expenditures, which in 
2003 were less than one-fifth of the expenditure in year 2000. After heavy cost-
cutting, Hanaro was able to post nominal operating profit in 2002 and 2003, although 
its profit after capital depreciation and interests remained strongly negative. Thrunet, 
the third largest service provider, has never been able to make operating profit. Due to 
its difficult economic situation, Thrunet sought court protection in March 2003 and 
tried to auction its shares. The bids were not accepted due to their low price. A new 
auction was launched in December 2004. In this auction Hanaro outbid Dacom, 
paying perhaps up to 450,000 KRW or 430 US$ per Thrunet customer, a price that 
analysts have claimed to be difficult to justify simply by revenue generation.
The economic difficulties of broadband access providers have also led to other 
changes in ownership. Hanaro is now controlled by a consortium led by the U.S 
American International Group and Newbridge Capital, which invested about 1.1 
billion US$ to the company in November 2003. Analysts see a possible merger of 
Hanaro and the leading mobile operator SK Telecom looming on the horizon. Dacom, 
in turn, is now part of the LG Group, which also controls Powercomm. The telecom 
units of LG, the second largest chaebol in Korea, are currently struggling along, with 
Dacom’s sales stagnant for the last five years, and Korea’s smallest mobile operator 
LG Telecom having a debt-equity ratio of 300 percent at the end of 2004 and most 
probably making considerable losses when the mobile number portability will be fully 
established in 2005. Analysts therefore expect mergers and acquisitions.
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Figure 8. Broadband service providers by subscribers, July 2004 (source: MIC).
The subscriber numbers for the different broadband providers and the access 
technologies used at the end of 2003 are shown in Table 4. The Korean broadband 
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analysts have suggested that the Thrunet subscriber numbers may have been about 30 
percent inflated before the auction in December 2004, and that the subscriber numbers 
could be close to 1 million in the end of 2004. Thrunet, on the other hand, has claimed 
that it has not included non-paying subscribers in its subscriber numbers. KT was 
estimated to have about 6 million subscribers and Hanaro about 2.8 million 
subscribers in December 2004.
Table 4. Broadband subscribers by service provider and access technology in Korea, Dec. 2003 
(source MIC).
xDSL Cable LAN Satellite Total Market Share
KT 5,230,342 - 353,880 4,836 5,589,058 50.0%
Hanaro Telecom 1,093,261 1,290,150 342,152 - 2,725,563 24.4%
Thrunet - 1,287,502 5,862 - 1,293,364 11.6%
Onse Telecom - 419,293 3,769 - 423,062 3.8%
Dreamline 56,178 89,546 3,874 - 149,598 1.3%
Dacom - 135,884 65,820 - 201,704 1.8%
Value-added 
operators 3,362 605,791 9,950 - 619,103 5.5%
Resellers 52,812 - 124,235 - 177,047 1.6%
Total 6,435,955 3,828,166 909,542 4,836 11,178,499 100%
Market Share 57.6% 34.2% 8.1% 0.1% 100% -
Detailed analysis of the broadband market
In December 2004, Korea had 31.58 million people who had used the Internet during 
the previous month, or 70 percent of the over-6 year population. Since the 
commencement of the commercial service in 1994, the number approached 1 million 
in 1997, 10 million in 1999, over 20 million in 2001.
In June 2004, computer users averaged 14.6 hours per week for using computer and 
more than half of the users spent more than 10 hours using computer.19 The most 
popular use was to access the Internet (82 percent), followed by games (41.5 percent) 
and information and data management (30 percent). The most common motives for 
using the Internet were “curiosity/fun” (31.5 percent), followed by “work” (15.7 
percent), “homework” (14.4 percent), and “searching for information” (13.2 percent). 
The reasons for using the Internet in December 2004 are shown in Figure 9.
19 Survey on the Computer and Internet Usage. Ministry of Information and Communication, National 
Internet Development Agency of Korea, September 2004.
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Figure 9. Reasons for using the Internet, December 2004 (source: NIDA).
Electronic commerce and purchasing are widely spread. B2B commerce grew 32.8 
percent from 2002 to 2003, reaching 207 trillion won, or about 170 billion US$. There 
were 260 B2B e-market sites in 2003. The consumer Internet purchasing grew 17 
percent from 2002 to 2003, reaching 7 trillion won, or about 5.8 billion US$.20 Over 
45 percent of Internet users aged 12 years and older had experience of Internet 
shopping in June 2004, and 19 percent have paid for Internet content.21
Korean Internet users are already quite experienced, with average Internet experience 
of almost four and half years. They access the Internet most often from home (90 
percent), followed by office (30 percent), public PC rooms (22 percent) and school 
(16 percent). The gender and age distribution of Internet users is shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Gender gap and Internet users in different age groups, June 2004 (source NDIA).
Age group total male female Gap(%)
Total 68.2 74.4 62.0 12.4
6-19 95.5 95.6 95.4 0.2
20’s 95.0 96.2 93.7 2.5
30’s 86.4 89.8 82.9 6.9
40’s 58.3 67.6 48.6 19.0
50’s 27.6 39.0 16.2 22.8
60 and older 7.3 12.2 3.8 8.4
20 NCA, 2004 Broadband IT Korea: Informatization White Paper, p. 32.
21 NIDA survey, referenced in footnote 16.
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What technologies are used – the role of existing infrastructures
According to the NIDA June survey, the most common access technology in Korea is 
xDSL, with 84 percent of Korean households using it to access the Internet, followed 
by cable modems at 11.6 percent. The penetration of the different Internet access 
modes in Korean households in December 2004 is shown in Figure 10 below.
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Figure 10. Internet access modes in Korea, December 2004. (source: NIDA)
Service provider statistics give higher rates for cable, close to 33 percent of all 
broadband subscribers at the end of 2003.22 The detailed subscriber numbers by 
technology at the end of 2003 can be seen in Table 6.23
Table 6. Internet subscribers, Dec. 2003 (source: KRNIC).
Leased 
Line CATV xDSL ISDN Dial-Up
P
C
L
BWLL/
WLL
Satellite 
Internet
Metro-
Ethernet
Wireless-
LAN
85,958 4,023,488 6,877,118 77,095 259,058 - 2,462 5,915 2,320 145,233
The cable operator Thrunet provided the first broadband service in Korea in July 
1998. Initially, the number of residential cable model subscribers exceeded ADSL 
subscribers, with the latter taking over in 2000. The main reason for this was 
Hanaro’s pre-emptive strategy, where it used ADSL to provide services to large 
apartment complexes. Hanaro also has provided cable access, and at present it has 
about 1.5 million cable modem broadband subscribers and about 1 million ADSL 
subscribers.24 In the early phases of broadband rollout in Korea, KT also used LAN 
Ethernet to address the shortage of ADSL equipment and to respond to Hanaro’s 
22 The reason for this discrepancy is at present unknown.
23 The KRNIC numbers for December 2003 are systematically higher than the numbers reported by 
MIC. The reason for this discrepancy is at present unknown.
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competition. The rapid growth of both ADSL and cable modem subscribers can be 
seen in Figure 11. The figure also shows that the growth rates are now slowing down.
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Figure 11. Internet subscribers in Korea, 1996-2003 (source: KRNIC).
Although the subscriber growth is slowing down, the speed of connections continues 
to grow. Hanaro launched the first commercial VDSL service in 2002, with 20 Mbps 
downstream and 6 Mbps upstream. In February 2003, KT launched a trial VDSL 
service at 50 Mbps.
The competition to deploy Korean mobile Internet, called WiBro, began in November 
2004, as Hanaro Telecom, KT and the largest mobile operator SK Telecom applied 
for the three business licenses. The licenses were granted in January 2005, and the 
commercial service is expected launch in April of 2006. The fees for the seven-year 
licenses were expected to be set somewhere between 117 billion won to 128.5 billion 
won depending on the specific schemes presented to the government. In March 2005, 
KT and SK Telecom each paid US$ 116.5 million license fees. A few days before 
Hanaro should have paid its first license payment, it announced that it would forego 
its license. As a reason it gave its focus on fixed-line broadband, and the fact that it 
should have invested about 500-700 billion won, or about 500-700 million US$, on 
WiBro in the next five years.
WiBro (Wireless Broadband), formerly known as 2.3GHz portable Internet, is part of 
the IEEE 802.16 family of wireless Internet specifications. In tests, WiBro has 
provided up to 3 Mbps connection to devices travelling at up to 60 kilometres per 
hour. Theoretical downstream speed is 18 Mbps and upstream 6 Mbps. WiBro is 
related to but different from the WiMax system that has been developed to send a 
24 In December 2004, Hanaro reported 961,513 residential ADSL subscribers and 1,438,649 residential 
cable modem subscribers. At the same time, it had 18,363 corporate ADSL subscribers and 1,143 
corporate cable modem subscribers. In addition, Hanaro had 272,900 VDSL, 20,187 broadband WLL, 
and 36,179 Wireless LAN subscribers. Cable modem subscribers were, therefore, 52 percent of the 
total.
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higher-bandwidth signal of several tens of megabits per second to fixed receivers over 
a distance of several tens of kilometres. The Korean portable Internet was originally 
to be based on a national standard. WiBro, however, is now based on technologies 
that are planned to be compatible with international standards. In November 2004, 
after negotiations with LG Electronics, Intel announced that it will secure 
compatibility with WiMAX and WiBro to avoid global market fragmentation. 
According to the Korea Information Strategy Development Institute (KISDI), the 
WiBro service is forecast to attract as many as 9.3 million subscribers by 2011. 
Analysts estimate that WiBro services via cell phones are unlikely to be possible in 
2006 but at least SK Telecom has announced that it will have dual-band CDMA 2000 
1x and WiBro handsets available at the time of the commercial launch. Though voice 
service is technically possible using WiBro, the carriers have stated that they will 
provide only data services.
As was noted above, the plans for developing broadband are closely connected with 
industrial policy in Korea. The rollout of services and infrastructures are linked with 
products and technologies where Korea sees potential for rapid growth and 
opportunity for global competitiveness. A central piece in the current Korean 
Information Society Strategy is the broadband convergent network (BcN), which will 
be used for video, data, and voice, and which will seamlessly combine wired and 
wireless access.25 The expected schedule and subscriber numbers for BcN are shown 
in Table 7. Early applications will include high-quality voice-over-IP and video-
telephony. The network is also expected to support interactive digital media 
broadcasting (DMB) for portable devices and, in its final stage, full broadband 
multimedia with guaranteed service quality.
Table 7. Plan for BcN schedule and subcriber numbers.
Early phase
2004-'05
Building phase
'06-'07
Completion phase
'08-2010
Example services Convergence videophone;
High-quality VoIP
Portable Internet;
Interactive DMB
HD multimedia with 
QoS
50~100Mbps 1.2 3.5 6
100Mbps 0.3 1 4
Subtotal 1.5 4.5 10
50Mbps 0.5 3.5 9.5
100Mbps - - 0.5
Subtotal 0.5 3.5 10
2 8 20
Wired 
subscribers
Wireless 
subscribers
Total (millions)
DMB has recently had high visibility in the Korean Information Society policy. TU 
Media, the affiliate of the leading mobile operator SK Telecom, launched free DMB 
pilot services in January 2005. The commercial launch was in May. DMB enables 
people to receive video, high-quality audio and data through handheld devices like 
handsets or in-car terminals. Video channels will feature news (YTN), music (M-Net 
of CJ Media), drama (SBS and MBC), sports, and games while audio channels 
include various kinds of music programs, English and Chinese conversation, and 
audio books. TU Media is planning to increase the number of channels from 20 to 
about 40, also adding data broadcasts from next year. The satellite-based DMB now 
25 MIC 2004, IT 8-3-9 Strategy: The Road to $20,000 GDP per capita.
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also includes a disaster warning system, which will be used to broadcast information 
both to subscribers and non-subscribers. The subscription price is 20,000 won (15 € or 
20 US$) and the monthly subscription fee 13,000 won (9.6 € or 13 US$). TU Media 
has waived the subscription fee and the monthly fee during the first month of the 
launch. There are now about 10 different DMB receiver models available for the 
consumers, including phones from Samsung and LG Electronics. In December 2004, 
World Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) Forum decided to propose Korea’s 
terrestrial DMB technology as a European standard to the European 
Telecommunication Standard Institute (ETSI). The ministry said that the adoption of 
the Korean terrestrial DMB technology as a European standard would enable Korea to 
secure core technologies of next-generation digital broadcasting, which will help 
Korea to take up favourable position in pre-empting the market.
Operator strategies including pricing schemes
Broadband subscriber prices in Korea have been among the lowest in the world since 
the introduction of the services. Early on, the subscription fees dropped to about 25 
US$. In 2002, monthly subscription fee, including modem rental, was about 25 US$ 
for residential ADSL and 32 US$ for business ADSL. Cable modem subscriptions 
had similar prices. As was noted above, the subscriber prices are now somewhat 
higher in dollar terms, and about 25 to 30 euros, including equipment rental and taxes. 
At these prices, Korean subscribers get on average 4 Mbps connections.
An important reason for the low subscriber prices has been very strong facilities-
based competition, created by heavy investments in competing networks, but also 
exceptionally easy access to the customers and their local network. Korea has a rather 
unique competitive environment in the local loop, as wiring to the customer premises 
is often owned by the customers themselves, instead of telecom operators. In this 
sense, the local loop in Korean networks has been unbundled and open for 
competition by default. Whereas in many other countries dominant operators have 
been slow to provide local loop access to their competitors and have charged fees that 
have in many cases made competing services economically unviable, this bottleneck 
has not reduced the speed of broadband diffusion in Korea.
In fact, this lack of local-loop bottleneck has benefited the diffusion of broadband for 
two reasons. In many European countries, opening up the local-loop for competition 
has required intervention from policy-makers and the regulators. This has typically 
led to lengthy negotiation rounds. After the terms for unbundling have been defined, 
competition has subsequently been introduced in the market. In practice, the 
implementation of local loop competition has often been slow, as incumbents have 
not had any major interest in facilitating the entry of new competitors. This has 
created a multi-year delay in launching effective competition in many countries. In 
contrast, the Korean operators had to face very strong competition and the possibility 
of profit erosion early in the process. As the local-loop bottleneck has been of limited 
importance, also the policy-makers have been able to focus on other issues.
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KTs competitors have also effectively used the possibilities to combine existing 
facilities. In particular, regional cable TV networks have been available for Hanaro 
and Thrunet as an alternative access channel to customer households. Cable TV 
operators, which have had exclusive licenses in their regions, have not themselves 
provided data communication services. This has left the market to Thrunet, Hanaro 
and other broadband providers. Cable TV operators simply share revenues with 
broadband providers, without competing with them. In effect, also the cable network, 
therefore, has been unbundled in Korea.
In contrast to many other countries, the dominant operator KT therefore has been 
unable to drag its feet. Instead, it has actively marketed its broadband services. First, 
it had to respond to competitors on the market, as it could not slow them down using 
its control over local loop access. Second, for historical reasons, KT was not the 
dominant player in leased line data communication market, where Dacom had 
monopoly until the end of the 1980s. In other countries, many incumbent telecom 
operators have found it difficult to cannibalise their leased line market, where 
subscription prices have been high. Third, the rapid diffusion of mobile phones in 
Korea meant that fixed line subscriber growth ground to halt in 1998, and in 1999 
mobile phone penetration exceeded fixed line penetration. The growth in fixed line 
market was therefore mainly seen in data communications services, where the average 
revenue per user was up to seven times higher than in basic voice services. Given this 
competitive setting, the rapid rollout of ADSL broadband services was clearly an 
attractive choice for KT, as it could effectively leverage its existing copper-based 
network to provide services to this rapidly growing market. Heavy competition has 
therefore led to low broadband subscriber prices.
An important reason for the low subscriber prices has also been policy. Early on, the 
Ministry of Information and Communication indicated that it prefers prices that are 
among the lowest in the world. Although there is no formal price control for 
broadband subscriber prices, the strong role of MIC and its capability to direct 
investment funding and negotiate the conditions for competition means that service 
providers take also the information society development policies into account.
In the Korean broadband development, the economic downturn of 1997-98 played an 
important role. The economic crisis occurred at a time when the global Internet boom 
was about to arrive its peak. A large number of recently unemployed people looked 
for new ways to earn their income. The emerging availability of low-cost leased-line 
access to the Internet produced a large number of entrepreneurs who started to 
provide Internet access in “PC rooms.” The first PC rooms or “PC Bangs” emerged in 
1998, and their number skyrocketed to 22,549 in 2001.26
To set up a PC bang, a new entrepreneur had to buy or lease PCs and some chairs and 
tables, and connect the room to the Internet using a broadband link. The high-speed 
26 NCA 2004: White Paper Internet Korea, p. 31.
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connection enabled e-mail, chatting, music downloading, participation in on-line 
communities, and most-important, multiplayer online games.
PC Bangs became very popular for four reasons. First, they were attractive business 
propositions to people who were looking for income and work. They required 
relatively low investments, and as soon as the network was operating, they produced a 
steady revenue stream. This rapidly increased the supply of broadband access in 
Korea. Second, PC Bangs used hourly rates in the range of 1 US$ and less, which 
made them attractive and possible for young people, who actively experimented with 
new services and shared knowledge about them. Third, the rapidly growing PC bang 
user group provided the critical mass of Korean-speaking broadband users. This made 
business models based on content creation attractive. Finally, the fast national 
broadband backbone enabled the users in different PC rooms to be connected at high-
speeds. This produced the killer-application in the content business: making 
multiplayer on-line games possible within Korea. The boom in PC Bangs was also 
reflected in the growth of Internet service providers. Between 1998 and 2002 the 
number of ISPs grew almost five-fold. Since the second-half of 2002, the ISP sector, 
however, as started to consolidate, as can be seen in Figure 12.
Number of KRNIC member ISPs
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Figure 12. Internet service providers in Korea (source: KRNIC).
KT published its “KT Future Strategies 2010” in August 2004.  CEO Yong-Kyung 
Lee stated that “in consideration of our close connection with the government's 
policy, KT’s new industrial growth engines will be aligned with the country’s IT 8-3-
9 policy, and this is an expression of our willingness to play a leading role in 
implementing this beneficial policy.” KT aims to invest 3 trillion won (about 1 billion 
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US$) annually until 2010 to develop five new growth engines. The new growth 
engines are next-generation mobile communications, including WiBro and 4G, home 
networking, media, IT services, and digital contents.
The role of alternative networks
Industry consolidation has been going on in the broadband Internet market already for 
some time in Korea. It may be expected that the convergence of fixed and wireless 
networks and multimedia content will lead to further rearrangements in the related 
industries. In particular, voice-over-IP (VoIP) will potentially erode revenues from 
traditionally profitable voice services, perhaps forcing KT and others to move towards 
content provision. The challenge here, however, is that unless the content is produced 
free, for example by the users themselves, it will be difficult for the network operators 
to retain profits. Indeed, traditional voice services were highly profitable exactly 
because phone users generated the content themselves and also because the historical 
and natural monopolies provided network operators considerable pricing power. As 
competing infrastructures become available, operators, content distributors and 
service providers need new business models.
KT, in particular, seems invest aggressively, up to 1 trillion won or about 1 billion 
US$, in WiBro over the next five years. It also seeks to combine its wireless local 
area network (WiFi) in areas where WiBro services might be blocked. KT has about 
15,000 WiFi access points in Korea, which enable people to connect to the Internet at 
a maximum speed of 11Mbps. It has also started to upgrade its WiFi services, offering 
now a speed of up to 54 Mbps with an average throughput of 25 Mbps.
SK Telecom, in turn, tries to mix WiBro with digital multimedia broadcasting 
(DMB). Whereas KT will complement WiBro with fixed WiFi, SK Telecom could 
perhaps try and use its WCDMA 3G network to complement WiBro. SK Telecom and 
Hanaro also made a collaboration agreement just before submitting their WiBro 
license applications in December 2004. Under the agreement, Hanaro and SK 
Telecom will share their base stations and access networks for WiBro nationwide, 
excluding Seoul and six provincial cities. As noted above, Hanaro, however, gave up 
its WiBro licence in April, showing that the strategies are continuously being adapted. 
Also the WCDMA subscriber numbers have remained very low, which seems to slow 
down investments in the 3G WCDMA infrastructure.
Hanaro, in turn, agreed to share 451 base stations with KRT net, a company that 
exclusively holds and operates base stations in military facilities and remote rural 
areas. After its merger with Thrunet, Hanaro will have about 4 million households as 
customers. In principle, it could try to roll out innovative new broadband architectures 
and services. In theory it could, for example, combine VDSL or cable modems with 
wireless home networks, WiBro, and WiMax to provide ubiquitous voice and 
multimedia data access to its customers. Hanaro could then become a local phone 
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service company, as originally planned—this time, however, by providing voice-over-
IP.
Government sponsored Internet centres also provide broadband access in Korea. 
Between 2000 and 2003, the local government constructed 5,477 access centres and 
post office 2,786 access centres. In addition, there are about 24,000 Internet-Cafés, or 
“PC Bangs,” in Korea.
Key applications of broadband services  
The distribution of content market is shown in Figure 13.
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Figure 13. Digital contents market in Korea, 2003 (source: Korea Institute of Multimedia 
Contents and Software).
Korea has been the leading country in the development and use of multiplayer on-line 
games. The gaming phenomenon has, indeed, become a key driver in broadband 
diffusion. The leading game players are national heroes, and both fixed line and 
mobile operators spend huge sums to recruit top players. KTF, the KT mobile affiliate 
and the second largest mobile operator, has been reported to pay 7 trillion won for 
two leading players.
It has often been stated that the Korean interest in games would have a cultural basis. 
An alternative explanation could be that the rapid expansion of on-line games was 
simply generated by the availability of broadband infrastructure. The Korean PC 
Bangs were connected at high speed to the Korean broadband backbone, allowing 
interconnections with low latency and short delays between the users of PC Bangs, as 
well as interactive graphics in games. This infrastructure was necessary for the 
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development of massively distributed multiplayer role-games. If a similar technical 
architecture would have been available in other countries, it is possible that the 
popular “Korean interest in games” explanation for the rapid diffusion of broadband 
in Korea would lose some of its credibility. One factor in the success of multiplayer 
computer games in Korea has also been the fact that Korea has restricted Japanese 
imports. Instead of specialized game consoles, Koreans have therefore focused on PC-
based games. The popularity of multiplayer games indicates that the Koreans have 
been early movers in the on-line game market. The idea that Koreans would be 
particularly interested in gaming does not however seem to have any robust scientific 
evidence. An alternative explanation is that the interest in multiplayer games could be 
quite culture independent, and the popularity of multiplayer games in Korea could 
simply result from the wide availability of broadband access and the lack of 
availability of game consoles.
The online game market is expected to be growing in Korea during the next years, 
with fastest growth in mobile games. The game revenues in PC Bangs are expected to 
saturate, as households now have their own broadband connections. The growth of the 
Korean game market is shown in Table 8. Korean online game producers have been 
extremely successful domestically, and they are now exporting software and game 
concepts to China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia. In 2003, Korean online games 
accounted for about 7 percent of the global online gaming market.
Table 8. Korean game market forecast (source: Korean Entertainment System Industry 
Association, Dec. 2003).
Market 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 annual 
growth 
rate
Online-game 1,628 2,985 4,656 7,042 9,330 11,168 12,406 13,145 28.0%
Mobile-game 17 497 727 1,352 2,474 4,125 6,422 9,491 63.5%
PC-game 1,323 1,810 902 1,275 1,276 1,277 1,278 1,278 -5.6%
Arcade-game 5,844 3,528 4,142 3,984 3,894 3,830 3,782 3,745 1.0%
Console
HW 18 29 1,012 1,015 1,512 1,649 1,947 2,238 106.3%
SW 72 117 898 943 1,009 1,435 1,700 1,973 60.1%
Total 90 146 1,910 1,958 2,521 3,084 3,647 4,211 75.1%
Subtotal 8,902 8,966 12,337 15,611 19,495 23,484 27,535 31,870 23.5%
Online Internet 
café
13,343 19,832 19,441 22,763 23,873 24,446 24,731 24,870 3.8%
Computer-
game room
8,634 5,969 6,570 5,928 5,703 5,543 5,422 5,329 -1.9%
Total 30,879 34,767 38,348 44,301 49,072 53,473 57,688 62,069 10.1%
The sales of digital music industry in Korea was about 154 million US$ in 2003, with 
mobile ringtones representing about 70 percent of this market. Most of the music 
downloads occurred through file-sharing systems that did not charge for the content.
The online movie market was about 80 billion won, or about 70 million US$ in 2003. 
There were over 300 online movie websites. The sales ratio for adult movies and 
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domestic feature movies was about 6:4 in 2002 and 3:7 in 2003. This change was at 
least partly caused by government regulations concerning adult-oriented websites.
The availability of broadband connections has also made Internet broadcasts possible. 
In this area, entertainment content is the market leader, with 28 percent in 2003, 
followed by educational content, at 14 percent. The distribution of Internet broadcasts 
by content type is shown in Table 9.
Table 9. Internet broadcasts in Korea, Dec. 2003 (source: NCA / IT Public Webcasting).
No. of Internet
Broadcasts %
Education/Study 66 14.3
Vocational education 29 6.3
School 44 9.5
Sports 14 3.0
Animation 6 1.3
Entertainment 14 3.0
Movies 21 4.5
Music 60 13.0
Games 4 0.9
Other amusements 11 2.4
Public institutions 12 2.6
Companies/Organizations 10 2.2
Society/Culture/Welfare 30 6.5
Regional information/Living 
information 50 10.8
Current issues/Economy/Management 22 4.8
Arts 5 1.1
Religion 18 3.9
Teens 11 2.4
Hobby/Leisure 26 5.6
News 4 0.9
Health/Medicine 5 1.1
Total 462 100
Identification and analysis of key drivers and inhibitors
Korea’s leading position in the global broadband diffusion has produced several 
studies that have tried to explain the factors that underlie the development of Internet 
and broadband in Korea.
The U.K. DTI study27 proposed that six success factors underlie the rapid expansion 
of broadband in Korea: 1) geography and demographics, 2) government leadership, 3) 
facilities-based competition, 4) the PC bang phenomenon, 5) pricing, and 6) the 
27 DTI Overseas mission to South Korea. Brunel University, 2002.
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emergence of clear user benefits. The ITU Korean Broadband study28, in turn, points 
out that Korea has a very high literacy rate and very high school enrolment rates. ITU 
also highlights the role of the domestic Korean IT equipment industry, which 
successfully reduced the cost of ADSL equipment.
A number of academic studies have also focused on the factors that underlie 
broadband diffusion in Korea. Lee, O’Keefe and Yun29 proposed that the matching of 
demand and supply was the most important factor, produced by fierce infrastructure 
competition, online gaming, and social and cultural factors such as housing patterns, 
social pressure to keep up with the neighbours, and tight social networks. They also 
noted that the economic crisis of 1997 and the deregulation of telecom industry 
played an important role both by in increasing the government efforts to move Korea 
to the knowledge-based economy and by providing entrepreneurial opportunities for 
unemployed people. Lee and Chan-Olmsted30, in turn tried to compare the U.S. and 
Korean broadband diffusion patterns using a modified Porterian diamond model of 
national competitive advantage. They found out that, in particular, active government 
policies have probably created more predictable roadmaps for the evolution of 
broadband and related technologies in Korea than in the U.S., where uncertainties 
concerning the future have perhaps slowed down broadband-related investments. Park 
and Yoong31, in turn, argued that market and technological factors were the key 
drivers. They also noted that consistent and strong government policies that promoted 
competition, developed the information infrastructure and created demand were 
important; as well as socio-cultural factors such as PC Bangs, housing patterns, and 
cultural homogeneity.
Although some broadband diffusion factors in Korea are now taken more or less for 
granted—such as the importance of housing structure—one needs to be careful in 
interpreting and extrapolating them. As almost 80 percent of Koreans live in densely 
populated urban areas, cost effective deployment of broadband infrastructure has been 
exceptionally easy in Korea. According to the DTI report, construction costs 
accounted for only 14 percent of cost per ADSL subscriber in Korea in 2002.32 About 
95 percent of the population live within 4 kilometres of KT’s local exchanges, which 
made it possible for KT to use its existing copper wiring to provide ADSL. Almost 
half of the population lives in large apartment complexes with up to 600 dwellings per 
building. Building regulations set up in the 1970s have required that these apartment 
complexes have a single communications room in the basement, from which all the 
apartments can be accessed using the in-house wiring.
28 ITU 2003: Broadband Korea: Internet Case Study, ITU, March 2003.
29 Lee, H., O’Keefe, R.M. & K. Yun (2003): The growth of broadband and electronic commerce in 
South Korea: contributing factors. The Information Society, 19. pp. 81-93.
30 Lee, C. & S.M. Chan-Olmsted (2004): Competitive advantage of broadband Internet: a comparative 
study between South Korea and the United States. Telecommunications Policy, 28(9/10), pp. 649-677.
31 Park, S. & S-H Yoon (2005): Separating early-adopters from the majority: the case of broadband 
Internet access in Korea. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, In press.
32 KT reported costs of about USD 360 per ADSL subscriber in 2000 and USD 273 in 2002. 
Construction work represented 14 percent, backbone transmission 24 percent, gigabit switch router 20 
percent, and equipment 42 percent.
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This, however, does not mean that high urban density or large apartment complexes 
would be drivers for broadband diffusion. More accurately, they are contextual factors 
that have influenced decision-making in specific historical moments of time. In fact, 
the associated driver has been related to a specific configuration of competitive power 
in Korea in 1999. The ownership structure of in-building wiring and unbundled cable 
networks in effect removed the local loop bottleneck. Unregulated Internet access 
service markets and ADSL made it possible for new entrants to use this opportunity to 
rapidly roll out Internet access services. Although, economically speaking, ADSL was 
“impossible” in the conventional business sense, the widely communicated “new 
economy” model where large economic losses were justified by future profit 
opportunities, made it possible to by-pass traditional profit models. At the same time, 
the rapid expansion of Internet content and the fixed pricing of broadband services 
made the new services attractive for a large customer base. The dominant operator 
realised that its traditional profit models were eroding, and it responded aggressively, 
trying to pre-empt the new entrants.
This logic cannot be repeated in other countries. New technologies and technical 
architectures have become possible, and the cost structures have changed radically 
during the last seven years. For example, the traditional local loop bottleneck has only 
limited importance today, both because alternative channels have become available 
and because local loop unbundling is now to a large extent implemented in many 
countries. After the Internet boom and crash, many investors are also more 
conservative, and require profit and effective management of economic risks.
Economic actors have been the main drivers of the broadband diffusion in Korea. The 
government, however, has also been very active in promoting information society in 
Korea. The Korean initiatives to build a nation-wide broadband backbone started 
already in the 1980s with the National Basic Information System (NBIS) project. 
Although the NBIS project and its follower Next Generation NBIS (NGNBIS) had 
only limited success, they provided the foundation for the Korean Information 
Infrastructure (KII) projects that were launched in 1995. The KII project consisted of 
a high-speed government funded network, the New Korea Network – Government 
(NKN-G), and the commercial New Korea Network – Public (NKN-P). The NKN-G 
provided high-speed connections for government agencies and universities, whereas 
the NKN-P was supposed to become the basic infrastructure for broadband 
multimedia information services for private firms and homes.
Competition has also been very heavy in Korea. The common claim that facilities-
based competition is important for broadband diffusion is not, however, exactly 
appropriate in Korea. The new entrants Hanaro and Thrunet were able to use 
Powercomm’s hybrid fibre-cable network to get access to customers. As the in-
building wiring is owned by the building owners in Korea, the dominant player KT 
could easily be by-passed by connecting the building telecom room into the 
competing networks. The copper-based network was unbundled only in 2002. The 
relatively slow unbundling has not been a major factor in Korea, as the cable TV 
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networks have also been effectively unbundled and as the building owners have 
controlled the in-building wiring.
As the PC Bangs grew in popularity, they provided a very efficient marketing channel 
for the new broadband services. Because a large majority of broadband users were 
accessible to PC Bangs, there was little need to invest in general consumer marketing 
and advertising. For the customers, PC Bangs gave the opportunity to try out and 
learn broadband services without committing to monthly subscriber fees and 
expensive equipment purchases. PC Bangs also provided a critical mass of potential 
customers that were necessary for the success of content providers. For example, 
about 80 percent of the revenues of the leading online game provider NCsoft came 
from PC Bangs when it launched its first products. The large broadband user group 
that PC Bangs created further became a key factor in generating demand for home 
broadband services.
Broadband subscriber fees have been low since the introduction of the service. This 
was encouraged by the Korean government policy that viewed broadband as a key to 
social and economic development. Korean policymakers therefore wanted to avoid a 
situation where only high-income families would have access to the service.
The government and service providers have also highlighted the potential educational 
benefits of broadband access. In particular, the Korean government has been active in 
supplying high-quality educational content through the web. The educational potential 
of the broadband Internet has created both legitimacy and pressure on the parents to 
get broadband access to their children. These pressures have probably increased when 
children became familiar with the possibilities of broadband through PC Bangs. 
Children who had learned to play network games and use other content in PC Bangs 
could easily push their parents to get broadband access by borrowing the popular 
policy rhetoric of broadband as the key to educational success. To some extent, 
educational services on broadband have also replaced traditional after-school classes, 
allowing children to participate additional schooling and do their homework at home. 
In this sense, the various interests of the government, service providers, equipment 
manufacturers, parents, and their children have been well-aligned in Korea.
On the other hand, specific “killer content” has also been important in spreading 
awareness about the benefits of broadband. In particular, a 1999 video on Miss Korea 
1998 having sex with her manager was distributed on the Internet. As video content 
clearly shows the difference between Internet dial-up and broadband access, 
broadband advantages became widely known early on in Korea.
It has also been argued that the culturally homogeneous Korean society has increased 
diffusion of broadband services. Socio-cultural homogeneity probably has been 
important in the sense that when new applications and technologies become 
interesting and relevant for early users, they often are interesting also for the rest of 
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the society.33 Korean society, however, is also a Confucian society, where hierarchy is 
important. This combination has meant that the citizens, although being part of a 
homogeneous culture, also compete against each other in an attempt to climb the 
social ladder. This competitiveness has been effectively used by the Korean 
government, who early on started to certify buildings according to their broadband 
connection speed. New apartment complexes are often marketed by broadband access 
speed and their broadband certification is often visibly marked on the building walls.
Some of the main factors that previous studies have highlighted in their explanations 
of the rapid advance of broadband in Korea are shown in Figure 14.
33 This has been argued to create similar fast diffusion patterns in Korea and Finland, for example. For 
a more detailed analysis of the links between social structure and technology diffusion, see: Tuomi, I. 
Networks of Innovation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.
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Figure 14. Broadband diffusion factors in various studies.
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Policy and regulation 
Korean policymakers have been very active in promoting information technologies, 
based on the vision that the future of Korea depends on its capability to transform 
itself into a knowledge-based society and economy. In the Korean visions, 
Information Society is an “education welfare state,” where every citizen is given the 
possibility to develop his or her full potential. Information and communication 
technologies are also viewed as the path towards higher economic growth, better 
incomes, and global competitiveness. A purely economic view of development, 
however, does not well describe the Korean policies. The Korean visions, in 
particular, have perceived information and communication technologies as a key to 
social transformation. This strong developmental emphasis contrasts the Korean 
visions, for example, with the U.S. visions, where ICTs are more often described as 
technologies that improve economic efficiency and individual choice. The strong 
societal dimension also brings the Korean Information Society strategies relatively 
close to the European and in particular the Nordic models. A major difference, 
however, is the existence of strong links and detailed roadmaps for industrial 
development and information society policies, as well as the strong coordinating role 
of public policymakers. Such close links would be difficult in the present European 
Union.
Key government policy makers include the Ministry of Information and 
Communciation (MIC) and the National Computerization Agency (NCA). The 
Framework Act on Informatization Promotion of 1995 created the Informatization 
Promotion Committee in 1996, which is led by the Prime Minister and which has 
other ministers as its members. The Presidential Committee on Government and 
Innovation Decentralization (PCGID), in turn, acts as an advisory body to the office 
of the president, with a specific aim at public sector reform and e-Government. The 
institutional framework of the Korean informationalization policy is shown in Figure
15.
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Figure 15. Korean framework for national informatization (source: NCA).
The MIC has developed the Korean Information Society both by gradually 
deregulating it and by putting pressure on the large chaebols to open up for 
competition. Deregulation and increasing competition has not occurred at random, 
though. Koreans have been quite successful in opening their industries after the 
domestic industry has been strong enough for global competition. In particular, in the 
1990s Korea actively developed domestic standards and intellectual property that 
gave it simultaneously relatively protected domestic markets and time to develop 
competitive advantage. Recently, Korea has focused on international technology 
standards.
The Korean Information Society policies have also centered on skill development, 
industrial development, and the reduction of digital divides. To overcome the current 
and future shortage in IT skills, the government has invested 33.5 billion won in 
support of education in the information and communication area, establishment of a 
technical high school specializing in software development, and basic research in 
related subjects. Furthermore, the government has provided support for the 
development of a University Information and Communication Research Center, and 
Information and Communication University Overseas Scholarship Program for ASIC 
design and JAVA training. The government has also sponsored information and 
communication re-training courses for the unemployed with high academic 
backgrounds from traditional industries. This will assist such qualified unemployed to 
find jobs in the IT sector or to start new IT businesses. In addition, government 
support has been provided to IT professional education organizations, cyber 
universities involved in the field of information and communications, the invitation 
and training of foreign IT specialists and experts. To further develop human resources 
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in the IT field, the government has provided computer literacy training and education 
aimed at elementary and middle schools, housewives, the military, and the disabled.34
A major initiative in this area has been the three-year 10 Million People IT Education 
project, which was launched in mid-2000. Some 3.6 million people received basic 
Internet and computer training in this program in 2000, including over one million 
residents in local communities, about 300,000 housewives, and 23 thousand prison 
inmates. In total, almost 14 million people received training during the three years. 
The program was continued with the 2nd National IT learning program. A new four-
year IT Education Program for 5 Million Underprivileged started in the beginning of 
2005.
The government will invest approximately 430 billion won in expanding the 
involvement of regular educational organizations in information and communication 
education, as well as cooperation with overseas schools and universities. The 
government also plans to sponsor the retraining of industrial workers, bridge the 
digital gap among the populace, and develop a highly skilled workforce for the IT 
field. The government will expand its investments in discovering gifted IT talents in 
their early stages and nurturing them to contribute to the world economy.
Korean Digital Divide Act was established in 2001 and revised in 2002. It generated 
the five-year master plan for closing the digital divide, annual action plans, the 
“Digital Divide Closing Committee,” and launched the Korean Agency for Digital 
Opportunity and Promotion (KADO). The spending for the master plans is about 1.9 
billion US$, with about 300 million US$ in 2004. The 2004 annual action plan 
consisted of constructing high-speed information network in rural areas, supporting 
assistive technologies for disabled people, construction of 80 Internet access centres, 
recycling of PCs and Digital TVs to disabled and non-profit organisations, and 
providing IT education. KADO also developed content for disabled and the elderly, 
and engaged in international projects that aimed at closing the digital divide. Korean 
policies also included 30 to 50 percent discounts in telecommunication service 
charges to low-income and disabled users.
The failed attempt by Hanaro to enter local telephony services had shown that 
competition in the local loop was difficult without number portability. As a result, the 
government announced detailed plan to implement number portability in fixed 
telecommunication services in January 2001 and for the mobile market in January 
2002.
The Telecom Business Act of Korea mandated a new obligation in December 2000 to 
the facilities-based service providers (KT, Hanaro and Thrunet) to provide their 
unbundled elements to competitors. Furthermore, the government finalized the details 
of the obligation and a pricing scheme in December 2001, so that unbundling 
obligation also works in practice. The Telecom Business Act was enacted in 
34 http://www.kado.or.kr
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December 2000, and the government finalized the regulation setting out detailed 
requirements for unbundling, including pricing, in December 2001.35
As the Information Society is perceived to be a systemic transformation in the Korean 
society and economy, broadband policies are also very tightly connected with 
industrial and R&D policies. In 2000, the government designated 174 core strategic 
technologies for technology development projects in order to gain a technological 
competitive edge in the world market including the next-generation Internet, optical 
communications, digital broadcasting, wireless communications, and computer 
software, among others. In addition, the government has improved the appraisal 
system for the selection of research subjects, and has helped to establish effective 
research management methods for the efficient utilization of R&D funding and 
maximizing the benefits of R&D. At the same time, the government is concentrating 
on the development of innovative technology that forms the basis of securing 
sustained national competitiveness in the future.
An important factor in the Korean broadband development has been the 
Informatization Promotion Fund. This fund has rotated license auction fees and 
telecom taxes back to telecom infrastructure development. In contrast to most other 
countries, where, for example, 3G license fees were not earmarked, Korea has been 
able to provide low interest loans for communications infrastructure development in 
less-advantaged regions, as well as funding for Information Society –related R&D. 
The actual amount of the fund for 2004 was 1.2 billion US$, with 740 US$ earmarked 
for R&D.36
The role of FDI in Korea has been relatively minor, although about 13,600 companies 
made investments in Korea in 2003. After the financial crisis in 1997, the government 
initiated tax reduction measures for high-tech businesses, businesses in foreign 
investment zones and service businesses (exemption from or reduced national taxes 
for 10 years, local taxes for 15 years) to cope with the economic recession. In 2003, 
LG Philips LCD and Nokia TMC were the largest foreign companies in Korea, the 
former with about 5 billion US$ and the latter with about 2.6 billion US$ revenues. 
Indirectly, the rapid growth of the ICT sector has, however, legitimized domestic 
investments in the ICT infrastructure and skills.
Rent reduction policies are applied in industrial complexes for foreign companies, 25 
national industrial complexes, and Foreign Investment Zones, with 100 percent 
exemption for high-tech businesses and 75 percent reduction for general 
manufacturing industries. In the Foreign Investment Zones, companies that are more 
than 30 percent owned by foreign investors and have more than 10 regular full-time 
workers who have a master’s degree or higher with more than 3 years of R&D 
35 Local loop unbundling has been in effect since 2002, based on LRIC (long-run incremental cost) 
charging. A fully unbundled leased line is charged 9,200 won per month and a shared-line ASDL 
service 6,100 won a month. See, Ure, J. 2003: Competition in the local loop: unbundling or 
unbungling? Info, 5(5), pp. 38-46.
36 MIC, Investment Opportunities in Broadband IT Korea, p. 16.
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experience, can get free land leases, exemption for traffic increase taxes and 
exemptions or reductions of national and regional taxes. Research and Development 
programs and related investments can get low-interest loans, government matching 
funds and cash grants.
Hostile takeovers by foreign companies have been allowed since May 1998. 
Currently, there are no ceilings on foreign ownership of special and value-added 
telecommunication service providers. The ceiling on single-person ownership on 
facilities-based service providers has been abolished except as to Korea Telecom. 
Foreign aggregate ownership of facilities-based service provider is allowed up to 
49%. Acquisition by a non-telecom company has also been allowed. There is no 
foreign ownership ceiling on IT equipment and software businesses.
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Conclusion 
This section will discuss the emerging challenges of the Korean broadband 
development, including ENUM and VoIP, digital rights management systems, spam 
& scam, and payment systems for fixed-wireless gateways. The section will also draw 
some policy suggestions and learnings from the Korean case. The section will be 
written after expert review and comments.
The present draft uses the structure proposed in the BREAD project for country cases. 
The section titles may be revised in the final version.
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